

Analysis

24 AUG 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Proposed Letter to Dr. Brzezinski Regarding
Meeting with CIA Analysts

1. I have your letter to Dr. Brzezinski requesting that he meet with some of our analysts to amplify on his criticisms of our political analysis. Let me suggest that it would not be very productive to have such a meeting. I believe Dr. Brzezinski's problem has several aspects that really do not cast criticism on our present analysts:

a. Policy-makers always would like to have precise information and forecasts about political trends. These are always the most difficult and you will never make policy-makers totally happy.

b. Brzezinski has expressed the view to me on a number of occasions that it has been neglect of collection efforts in the past that has caused the present problem. Clearly, we have not concentrated on indigenous targets in most countries of the world and we have totally neglected areas like Africa south of the Sahara in years past. Until we build up an infrastructure of collection capability in those areas, our political reporting will necessarily suffer.

2. Beyond that, if I could just stress to your analysts the importance of the following guidelines:

a. Avoiding consensus or a least common denominator analysis just to get agreement within the intelligence community.

b. Clearly stating the pros and cons or the pressures for or against, rather than coming out with flat predictions that the "Soviets would...."

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In short, what the policy-makers like Brzezinski seek is an intellectual stimulation, not a definitive prediction. They want to be able to take our product and feel that it has helped them understand the problem in a way that they can add their own insight to it and come to their own conclusion.

3. In sum, I personally do not take Brzezinski's criticism as a personal affront to you, me and your analysts.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'S/T', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

STANSFIELD TURNER

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analysis

22 JUN 1977

The most frequent and deserved criticism of the intelligence product today is that it is particularly good in technical and hardware areas, but deficient in political analysis and forecasting. In my view, this is in part a reflection of the dominance of military influence over the intelligence system throughout the past 30 years. It argues the case for a more objective arbiter of the priority of intelligence effort.

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